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Abstract: This study aims to show that the volatility in food prices 
between 2008 and 2011 cannot be explained merely by the market 
fundamentals of demand and supply. While global changes in 
demand and supply are bringing about radical changes to the 
food equation, evidence shows that market failure in the world 
grain market aggravated the problem. Excess liquidity, brought 
about by monetary growth policies after the subprime crises 
and financial meltdown in 2008, has stimulated speculation and 
hoarding. Strong incentives for financial operators to find better 
returns in places like the commodities market is attested by the 
six-fold increase in the number of ‘derivatives’ contracts made 
between 2002 and 2008. Furthermore, agriculture is one of the 
most heavily subsidized, protected, and distorted markets in the 
world. This is a key reason behind a decade long lack of progress 
in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This 
study investigates the hypothesis that speculative activities are a 
major source of volatility in the agricultural commodities market 
and that this has significantly contributed to price inflation. It 
also explores Malta’s possible involvement in food commodity 
speculation, albeit on a small scale.
Keywords: food security, price hikes, speculation, financial 
derivatives, deregulation
Food commodity prices and the threat to food security
Agriculture has over the years experienced a decline as an industrial sector, particularly in the developed economies of Western Europe and North America. Government subsidies 
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and improvements in technology, such as the genetic modification of 
crops, have induced an ever-increasing supply. These, coupled with 
low income and price elasticities of demand, have rendered cheaper 
the price of food. Indeed, between 1974 and 2005, food prices on 
world markets fell by as much as 75 per cent in real terms1 with the 
price of all the three basic cereal staples, rice, wheat, and maize (corn), 
experiencing a long-run decline of more than 1 per cent per annum over 
the past century.2 
Rather than food price inflation, the issues of concern in affluent 
countries centred on production surpluses, ecological and environmental 
degradation and sustainability, domestic and industrial wastage, water 
management, and health-related problems, such as obesity and heart 
disease. That is why the unexpected and extraordinary price hikes 
experienced in 2008 and again between 2010 and 2011 have created 
socio-economic shocks throughout the world. Wheat prices, along with 
those of rice, maize, oilseeds, and dairy products, all reached record 
peaks in nominal terms. The Economist’s estimated food-price index 
for 2007–08 was higher than at any time since it was created in 1845.3
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)4 and World 
Bank5 estimates, the number of people in extreme poverty rose between 
130 to 150 million, with the total number of people living in hunger rising 
1 The Economist, ‘The end of cheap food’ (Cover story), Issue 385, 8558, (6 Dec. 
2007), 11–12. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/10252015 [Accessed 
10 June 2011]. 
2 C.P. Timmer, ‘Did Speculation Affect World Rice Prices?’ Agricultural Development 
Economics Division, FAO. ESWA Working Paper No.09-07. Presented at the Rice 
Policies in Asia Conference, united Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, 9–10 February 2009. Available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/
fao/011/ak232e/ak232e00.pdf [Accessed 7 July 2011].
3 Ibid., 1.
4 FAO (2008), ‘Number of Hungry People Rises to 963 Million: High food prices to 
blame – economic crisis could compound woes.’ Media Centre. Available at http://
www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/8836/ [Accessed 10 July 2011]; FAO (2009) 
‘World Food Situation’, Available at http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-
home/en/ [Accessed 10 July 2011].
5 World Bank (2009), ‘Global Economic Prospects Commodities at the Crossroads’, 
Washington DC 20433, uSA’, Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTGEP2009/Resources/ 10363_WebPDF-w47.pdf [Accessed 15 July 2011].
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to 963 million in 2008. Prices then fell sharply in the second half of 2008. 
But market tensions emerged again during 2010, and at least another 40 
million people around the world were driven into extreme hunger and 
deprivation. By early 2011, fears emerged that a repeat of the 2008 crisis 
was underway.6 The FAO food price index, measured in nominal terms, 
reached an all-time high in February 2011 (Figure 1, below).
Source: World Bank
Figure 1: Food Price Index at current and constant terms US Dollar (2005=100) 
1960–2011
What is striking about the current situation is the existence of high 
prices and simultaneously, the high volatility of these prices.7 According 
to a High Level Panel of Experts report (HLPE 2011) on Food Security 
and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security:
6 Oxfam International, uK (2011), ‘Growing a Better Future: Food justice in a 
resource-constrained world’, Available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.
org/files/cr-growing-better-future-170611-en.pdf [Accessed 25 July 2011].
7 J. Von Braun, ‘Rising food prices: what should be done’, IFPRI Policy Brief, 2033 
K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006-1002 uSA (2008). Available at http://www.
ifpri.org/pubs/bp/bp001.pdf [Accessed 10 July 2011]
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What is new on international food markets is the existence and persistence of 
upward pressures that provoke simultaneously higher and more volatile prices. 
...markets needed one of the worst depressions since World War II (with a 
growth rate of world output falling from +5.4 per cent in 2007 to +2.9 per cent 
in 2008 to - 0.5 percent in 2009) to get food prices down, and the fact that even 
with such a depression, food prices did not fall back to their pre-2006 levels.8
Of course, people in the Low Income Food Deficit Countries 
(LIFDCs) suffer the brunt of food price spikes9 because as much as 
80 per cent of their income is spent on food when compared to 10 to 
15 per cent in rich developed countries.10 Moreover, this renders the 
price elasticity of demand in poor countries to be much higher than in 
wealthier ones.11
Figure 2 presents the average own price elasticity for various food 
subcategories calculated for 114 countries and ranked in relation to 
their 1996 per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These were in 
turn categorized into three income groups: low, medium, and high12. 
8 HLPE Report (2011), ‘Price volatility and food security’, A report by the High 
Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World 
Food Security, Rome’, 21. Available at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
hlpe/hlpe_documents/HLPE-price-volatility-and-foodsecurity-report-July-2011.
pdf [Accessed 3 August 2011]. 
9 I. Maros and W. Martin (2008) ‘Implications of Higher Global Food Prices for 
Poverty in Low Income Countries’. World Bank Policy Research Paper No. WPS 
4594 (2008). Available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org [Accessed 10 July 2011]; 
J. Clapp, ‘Food Price Volatility and Vulnerability in the Global South: considering 
the global economic Context,’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 6 (2009), 1183–
96.
10 T. Hertel, P. Preckel, J. Cranfield, and I. Maros, ‘The Earnings Effects of Multilateral 
Trade Liberalization: Implications for Poverty’, The World Economic Review, 
18(2) (2004); Available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event%20docs/10.23.03%20
GDN%20Conf/Hertel%20-%20The%20Earnings%20Effects%20of%20
Multilateral%20Trade%20Liberalization.pdf [Accessed 10 July 2011].
11 A. Regmi, M.S. Deepak, J.L. Seale, Jr, and J. Bernstein (2001) ‘Cross-Country Analysis 
of Food Consumption Patterns. Changing Structure of Global Food Consumption and 
Trade’, Agriculture and Trade Report. Washington, uSDA Available at http://www.
ers.usda.gov/ Publications/WRS011/ [Accessed on 15 July 2011]
12 A Regmi, A. Muhammed, J.L. Seale, Jr., and B. Meade, ‘International Evidence 
on Food Consumption Patterns: an update using 2005 International Comparison 
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Consumers in low-income countries respond more readily to price 
changes than in high-income countries, with price elasticity varying 
from (-)0.5 for cereals, a staple food, in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to (-)0.063 for the uSA. Clearly, this is another way of saying 
that ‘when prices rise, populations in poor countries eat less food’.13
Source: Regmi et al. 2011
Figure 2: Global food price elasticity in relation to income
In a competitive market system, price variability is theoretically 
expected to generate maximum economic welfare by balancing 
out market variations in demand and supply and eliminating price 
disequilibria. However, price variability becomes problematic when it 
is large and unanticipated because the level of uncertainty that it creates 
increases risks for producers, traders, consumers, and governments. As 
stated in a joint policy report in preparation for the June 2011 meeting 
of the group of the 20 wealthiest nations (G20):
Program Data’, Washington, USDA Technical Bulletin, No. 1929, March 2001. 
Available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tb-technical-bulletin/tb1929.
aspx [Accessed on 26 December 2012].
13 HLPE 2011, 23.
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Suffice it to say that price volatility becomes an issue for concern and for 
possible policy response when it induces risk averse behaviour that leads to 
inefficient investment decisions and when it creates problems that are beyond 
the capacity of producers, consumers or nations to cope.14
Scope and method
This paper focuses on the hypothesis that the global food crisis experienced 
in 2008 and again in 2010 through 2011 was directly correlated with 
speculation in the financial derivatives market. This hypothesis has not 
been supported by empirical evidence. yet, many factors may explain 
the global food crisis and this paper investigates alternative explanations 
based on a literature search and official data published by international 
agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
FAO, and the united Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
This study does not aim to provide a comprehensive answer to 
what are the determinants of a food crisis. Rather the objective is to 
contribute towards the ongoing debate and this should be of interest to 
students, researchers, policy-makers, and anyone who has an interest in 
current global issues. 
One special aspect of this paper is an examination of the positive 
correlation between the high levels of imports in Malta carried out 
during the short period between 2007 and 2011, at a time of rising grain 
prices in the international market and food exports.
The study is limited by its dependence on data provided by official 
agencies. It could have benefited from quantitative and qualitative 
primary research which, owing to time restrictions, was not undertaken.
14 FAO, IFAD, IMF, OECD, uNCTAD, WFP, WORLD BANK, WTO, IFPRI, and 
uN HLTF, ‘Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses 
(2011). A joint policy report in preparation of the June 2011 G20 meeting in Paris. 
Rome 2011,7. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 40/34/48152638.pdf 
[Accessed 8 August 2011].
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The dynamics of the international food crisis: Underlying causes
Free-market economic theory is based on the concept that consumer 
demand and the supply of firms are closely interrelated and that this 
relationship determines market prices. Any change in any one or 
more variables that influence demand such as a change in households’ 
income, price expectations, population, etc. and/or any change in 
any one or more variables that influence supply such as the costs of 
production, price expectations and currency revaluations, technological 
developments, public policies, etc., would invariably bring about a 
change in market prices.
Demand and supply considerations in the global food market
In a background of supply constraints, the global food market has been 
experiencing ever-increasing prices. These constraints include adverse 
weather conditions across the globe, an increase in demand as a result 
of global population growth, urbanization and affluence in the rapidly 
developing economies of Asia and South America, the depreciation of 
the uS dollar, and the high cost of oil. 
Figure 3 below clearly illustrates, for example, the close relationship 
between oil and food prices.15 This is because agriculture is a heavy 
consumer of oil products with about 10 to 15 per cent of all energy in 
the industrialized countries. This is being used for chemical fertilizers, 
transport fuel, on-farm activities, and for the end of the value chain, that 
is, the processing of crops and food, refrigeration, and cooking.16
Furthermore, high oil prices have induced heavy investments in the 
production of ethanol, an important bio-fuel. Between 2007 and 2009 
bio-fuels accounted for 20 per cent of the global use of sugar cane, 9 per 
15 World Bank, ‘Commodity Markets’, Available at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0, contentMDK:21574907 
~menuPK:7859231~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.
html [Accessed 30 December 2012].
16 P. Hawken, L. Amory, and L. Hunter, Natural Capitalism (London, 1999).
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cent of vegetable oil and coarse grains and 4 per cent of sugar beet. In 
2010 ethanol production accounted to 40 per cent of maize production.17
Indeed, as attested by the HLPE (2011) report on World Food 
Security, the bio-fuel boom has had a major impact on the evolution of 
world food demand for cereals and vegetable oil, ‘increasing the share 
of the industrial use in world consumption of vegetable oils from 11 
percent to 24 percent between 2000 and 2010’.18
Moreover, government-imposed mandates to blend fixed proportions 
of bio-fuels with fossil fuels, or binding targets for shares of bio-fuels 
in energy use, aggravate the price inelasticity of demand and this has 
contributed to the volatility in agricultural prices.19
Source: World Bank
Figure 3: Food Price Index versus Crude Oil Prices at constant US dollar 
(2005=100) 1979–2012
17 FAO et al. 2011.
18 HTPE 2011, 32.
19 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Biofuel Support 
Policies: An Economic Assessment’, Paris (2008), Available at http://www.oecd.
org/ document/30/0,3343,en_2649_33785_41211998_1_1_1_1,00.html [Accessed 
25 July 2011].
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Moreover, government-imposed mandates to blend fixed proportions 
of bio-fuels with fossil fuels, or binding targets for shares of bio-fuels 
in energy use, aggravate the price inelasticity of demand and this has 
contributed to the volatility in agricultural prices.20
Another factor that has led to the food crisis is the use of trade policy 
restrictions. Around forty food-exporting countries have imposed some 
sort of trade restrictions, such as food taxes, quotas, or across-the-
board export bans. Average tariffs on agricultural and food are high for 
middle-income and high-income countries, 25 per cent and 22 per cent 
respectively.21 Trade Protectionism on agricultural products is not only 
as much as four times higher than on non-agricultural products, but it is 
also much more volatile.22
Agricultural trade policies tend to insulate domestic prices from 
world markets and lead to pro-cyclic effects. When prices are high, 
protection decreases, thereby increasing demand on world markets. 
When world prices are low, protection increases, effectively operating 
as a variable levy. Therefore, large country trade policies increase world 
price volatility and create negative externalities for smaller countries.23
In spite of World Trade Organization (WTO) efforts to liberalize 
world trade, data published by the OECD (2010) indicates that 
government support in OECD countries still accounts for 22 per cent of 
the total receipts of agricultural producers. More than half of that support 
20 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Biofuel Support 
Policies: An Economic Assessment’, Paris (2008), Available at http://www.oecd.
org/ document/30/0,3343,en_2649_33785_41211998_1_1_1_1,00.html [Accessed 
25 July 2011].
21 FAO et al. 2011.
22 A. Bouët and D. Laborde, ‘The potential cost of a failed Doha round’, IFPRI 
Discussion Paper 886. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
(Washington, DC, uSA, 2008). Available at http://www.ifpri.org/publication/
potential-cost-failed-doha-round [Accessed 10 July 2011].
23 O. De Schutter, ‘Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation 
to reduce the risks of price volatility’, Briefing Note by the united Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the rights to food, 02 September 2010. Available at http://www.
srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/ otherdocuments/20102309_briefing_note_02_en_
ok.pdf [Accessed 12 July 2011].
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is delivered in ways that are highly distorting of trade and competition.24 
A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute25 predicts 
that removal of trade restrictions would reduce world cereal prices by 
an average of 30 per cent.
The relationship between higher food grain prices and the increased 
demand for food from the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa) is another significant and contentious issue. China and 
India have huge populations that account for nearly 40 per cent of the 
total world population. In addition, their per capita incomes have been 
rising fast in recent years owing to very high levels of economic growth. 
This is a perfect example of a ‘demand shifter’. As income increases so 
does the demand for grain, both directly and indirectly because grain 
is a complementary source of livestock protein. Given current supply 
balances, one may conclude that such an increase in demand would 
invariably lead to higher food prices. In theory that would be correct 
and such a conclusion should explain current global perceptions as to 
who is mainly responsible for current food price hikes.26 
However, facts seem to indicate otherwise. According to the HLPE 
2011 report, hardly any change had been registered in the rate of grain 
consumption in India and China during the last decade. If anything, 
there has actually been a slowdown:
The apparent acceleration of feed use in the last decade, however, is more 
linked to a recovery of feed use in the Former Soviet union after the 1990s. It 
means that, even with the booming demand for meat in Asia, the growth of feed 
consumption outside the former Soviet union is not accelerating but is slowing 
down … Excluding use for bio-fuel, the growth rate for non-feed use is stable 
24 OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: At a Glance, (Paris, 2010). Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3746,en_2649_33773_45538523_1_1_1_1,00.
html [Accessed 25 July 2011].
25 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), ‘Speculation and world prices’, 
International Food Policy Research Institute Forum, 2008. Available at http://www.
ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/if22.pdf [Accessed 10 July 2011].
26 P. Krugman, ‘Soaring food prices’, New York Times, 5 February 2011. Available at 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/soaring-food-prices/ [Accessed 10 
July 2011].
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compared with the 1990s and markedly inferior to its historical performance. 
Without bio-fuel, the growth rate of world cereal consumption is equal to 1.3 
per cent compared with 1.8 per cent for bio-fuel.27
The report clearly blows up the ‘myth’ about increased consumption 
from developing countries leading to higher global demand and 
therefore, higher grain prices.28 
The point to be made here is that while prices are determined by the 
net effects of aggregate supply and demand changes over time, they 
cannot in themselves explain their inherent composition. As emphasized 
by Abbot, Hurt, and Tyner:29
The factors driving current food price increases are complex. We make no 
attempt to calculate what percentage of price changes are attributable to the 
many disparate causes, and, indeed, think it is impossible to do so.30
using a simple price formation model to explain the importance 
of analysing current price determination on the basis of consumer 
and producer short run elasticities in conjunction with their long run 
adaptations to price changes, Timmer concludes that:
The slow and steady shifters of both supply and demand can explain gradual 
increases in prices, such as seen from the early 2000s until late 2007. The lagged 
response to earlier periods of low prices can explain some acceleration in these 
prices, especially for rice and wheat. But the explosion in food prices late in 
2007 and in the first half of 2008 clearly requires additional explanation.31
27 HLPE 2011, 32.
28 J. Ghosh, ‘The truth about the global demand for food’, The Guardian, 2 August 
2011. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/aug/02/global-demand-for-food [Accessed 10 July 2011].
29 P.C. Abbot, C. Hurt, and W.E. Tyner ‘What’s Driving Food Prices in 2011?’ 
Farm Foundation Issue Report (FFIR) (uSA, 2011). Available at http://www. 
farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/1742-FoodPrices_web.pdf [Accessed 15 July 
2011].
30 Cited in Timmer, 10.
31 Ibid., 11.
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In other words, while market adaptations to changes in demand 
and supply may partially explain food price inflation, they cannot fully 
account for the magnitude of food price hikes and the erratic food price 
volatility experienced after 2007. Between 2005 and 2008 food prices 
rose by 83 per cent; wheat prices increased by 127 per cent, rice prices 
by 170 per cent, and maize prices nearly tripled. Prices started to fall at 
the end of 2008. The price of rice and wheat dropped by 55 per cent in 
the second half of 2008, while maize dropped by 64 per cent in the same 
period. International food prices then started to rise sharply again in the 
second half of 2010. The price index of food surpassed the peak levels 
of 2007–08.32 The Food Price Index (FAO 2010)33 increased by over 30 
per cent between June and December 2010, while the price index for 
cereals soared by 57 per cent during the same period.34
It is in the light of these food price explosions that the role of liberalized 
financial markets and speculation in financial derivatives has to be seen. 
Financial derivatives
In today’s globally interconnected and electronically accessible trading 
system, the role of financial derivatives and speculation in the ongoing 
food crisis has to be closely analysed. Indeed, evidence shows that 
large increases in speculative investment, driven by food commodity 
derivatives, have played a very significant part in pushing up global 
food prices.35 
32 uNCTAD, ‘The Least Developed Countries Report 2010: Growth, Poverty and the 
Terms of Development Partnership’. Available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
ldc2010_en.pdf [Accessed 14 July 2011].
33 FAO (2010) ‘Food Price Index’. Available at http://www.fao.org/ worldfoodsituation/
wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/ [Accessed 10 July 2011].
34 O. De Schutter, ‘Observations on the current food price situation’, united Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the rights to food. Background Note. 21 January 2011. 
Available at http://www.srfood.org /images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20110124_
background-note-food-price-situation_en.pdf [Accessed 10 August 2011].
35 J. Ghosh and C.P. Chandrasekhar (eds.), After Crisis: Adjustment, Recovery and 
Fragility in East Asia (New Delhi, 2009).
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Derivatives are financial instruments that include several types of 
contracts such as forwards, futures, options, or swaps. Briefly, these 
may be described as contracts made between two or more parties 
that agree to sell or buy a certain quantity of assets. Such assets may 
be stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates, or market 
indexes. Options and futures are the most commonly drafted contracts, 
the former being financial instruments that convey the right, but not 
the obligation, to engage in a future commodity transaction. A future 
contract is a standardized contract with the parties involved binding 
themselves to a contractual obligation to buy or sell at a certain date in 
the future, and at a specified price.36
‘Futures’ are extremely important in commerce and they have 
been used since Greco-Roman times as a form of insurance against 
commercial risks, a process of commercial speculation also known as 
‘hedging’. However, when left unregulated, ‘futures’ may be used as 
a means of making large profitable gains, sometimes with devastating 
negative effects on society and the economy. Inflationary pressure 
may be one such effect. By artificially increasing demand, ‘futures’ 
may induce prices to increase above their real value and this would 
in turn induce further purchasing by speculators in the hope that price 
will continue to rise. A ‘positive feedback loop’ in which prices rise far 
above the underlying value of the commodity would be created. This is 
what inflates ‘economic bubbles’.37 
While dire consequences, such as the infamous Bengal famine of 
1943 in which three million people died,38 may at times be brought about 
by the manipulation of market prices through the hoarding of essential 
goods when these are in short supply, more sinister effects may result 
from the excessive speculation of non-commercial speculators.39 This 
36 N. Pace, A. Seal, and A. Costello, ‘Food commodity derivatives: a new cause of 
malnutrition?’, The Lancet, Vol. 371, Issue 371, 1648–50, 17 May 2008.
37 Ibid.
38 A.K. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1999), cited in De Schutter.
39 T. Wise, ‘What Food Crisis? Measuring Global Hunger’, Global Development 
and Environment Institute, Tufts university, Medford MA 02155 (uSA, 2011). 
Available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/ Pubs/rp/GC27July11Wise.pdf [Accessed 10 
July 2011].
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form of speculation, also known as ‘momentum-based speculation’,40 
allows investors, mainly institutional investors such as banks, insurance 
companies, and pension funds, to make profits by investing in 
‘derivatives’ based on commodity price indices. A commodity index is 
a large sum of money managed by a specialized fund manager who uses 
that money to buy a basket of ‘futures’. Values are calculated on the 
basis of the returns made in the specified commodity exchanges. The 
most famous index is the S&P GSCI, formerly known as the Goldman 
Sachs Commodities Index, set up in 1991 and another well known 
index is the Dow Jones-AIG Index.41
The effect of the commodities index funds in post 2008 appears to 
have been to throw the commodities futures markets into ‘contango’, 
producing a vicious circle of prices spiralling upward. The uS 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)42 defines ‘contango’ 
as the ‘market situation in which prices in succeeding delivery months 
are progressively higher than in the nearest delivery month’.43 In no 
complimentary terms, a European union Commission Report describes 
such a situation as ‘… herding behaviour in times of strong (usually 
upward) price trends, which in developed and easily accessible markets 
can result in the emergence of speculative bubbles’.44.
40 y. Fu and W. Qian, ‘Information Diffusion, Momentum Speculation and Price 
Reversal: Evidence from a Residential Presale Market’, IRES Working Paper 
2011–07. Available at http://www.ires.nus.edu.sg/workingpapers/IRES2011-007.
pdf [Accessed 10 July 2011]. 
41 C.L. Gilbert, ‘How to understand High Food Prices’, Journal of Agricultural 
Economics; Vol. 61, Issue 2, 398–425, June 2008. Available at http://www.fao.org/
es/esc/ foodpriceswing/papers/HowtounderstandHighFoodPrices.pdf [Accessed 
10 July 2011].
42 CFTC (uS Commodity Futures Trading Commission) (2011). Available at http://
www.cftc.gov/ LawRegulation/CommodityExchangeAct/index.htm [Accessed 10 
August 2011].
43 Standard and Poor’s, Fact sheet (2011). Available at http://www.standardandpoors.
com/ indices/sp-gsci/en/us/?indexId=spgscirg--usd----sp------. [Accessed on 3 
August 2011].
44 European union Commission, ‘Is there a Speculative Bubble in Commodity 
Markets?’ Commission Staff Working Document, Task force on the role of 
speculation in agricultural commodities price movements, SEC 2971, 3.Available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ publication13765_en.pdf. 
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As index funds generally bet ‘long’ on rising prices, they tend 
to purchase and hold on to their investments for a longer time than 
the typical commercial hedger does. This further pushes prices up, 
attracts even more ‘speculative capital’ into the market and adds to 
price volatility.45 As illustrated in Figure 4, ‘spot’ prices increased 
dramatically after 2002. ‘Futures’ prices then followed suit, setting off 
a chain-reaction in the market.46
Source: Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg CFTC Commitment of Traders CIT Supplement (Cited in 
Masters and White 2008) 
Figure 4: Commodity Index Investment compared to S&P GSCI Spot Price 
Commodity Index
[Accessed 5 August 2011]
45 T. Wise, ‘Food Price Volatility: Market fundamentals and commodity speculation’ 
(2011). Available at http://triplecrisis.com/food-price-volatility/ [Accessed 10 July 
2011].
46 M.W. Masters and A.K White, ‘The Accidental Hunt Brothers: How Institutional 
Investors Are Driving up Food and Energy Prices’, Special Report, 31 July 2008. 
Available at http://www.loe.org/images/content/080919/Act1.pdf [Accessed 10 
July 2011].
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Whereas the traditional speculator may drive up the price of a 
commodity by physically hoarding the commodity, the index speculator 
and the fund manager accomplish the same objective by hoarding 
futures paper contracts for those commodities.47 They need not bother 
about maintaining a warehouse; their hoarding is purely and solely 
virtual. 
Speculation and Food Prices
Some experts express some scepticism about the role of speculation 
in inducing commodity price hikes. While confirming the dramatic 
increase in the number of investors in the futures market and the very 
strong increase in the share of index funds in the Commodity Futures 
market before the 2008 peak in commodity prices, Sanders does not see 
that level of speculative activity as high by historical standards.48 Gilbert 
made a similar conclusion,49 while Krugman bases his scepticism on the 
argument that speculation in the futures market can only be blamed for 
increasing food prices if it is accompanied by hoarding. Since there is 
little evidence of hoarding, he concluded that speculation cannot be the 
cause of the surge in food prices.50 51
47 Ibid.
48 D.R. Sanders, S.H. Irwin, and R.P. Merrin (2008) ‘The adequacy of speculation in 
Agricultural Futures Markets: Too Much of a Good Thing?’, Applied Economic 
Perspectives and Policy, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2010), 77–94 doi:10.1093/aepp/ppp006. 
Available at http://aepp.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/1/77.full.pdf+html 
[Accessed on 25 July 2011]. Is the date 2008 or 2010? There is an inconsistency!
49 C.L. Gilbert, ‘How to understand High Food Prices’, Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 61, Issue 2 (2008), 398–425, June. Available at http://www.fao.org/
es/esc/foodpriceswing/papers/HowtounderstandHighFoodPrices.pdf [Accessed 10 
July 2011]
50 P. Krugman, ‘Commodity Prices (Wonkish)’, New York Times, 19 March 2008. 
Available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/commodity-prices-
wonkish/ [Accessed 10 July 2011].
51 Id., ‘Nobody Believes in Supply and Demand,’ New York Times, 10 December 2011 
Available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/nobody-believes-in-
supply-and-demand/ [Accessed 10 July 2011].
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Although data on stocks is globally lacking, a point highlighted in 
the recommendations drawn up in the June 2011 G20 Paris meeting,52 
evidence does exist of hidden hoarding. The IFPRI report pointed out 
that hidden hoarding may take the form of: ‘households hoarding rice, 
and importers buying more than they normally do, and these small 
amounts may add up to sizeable quantities’.53 In addition, panic buying 
of food grain and government export restrictions may not be reflected in 
global stock data, rendering statistical analysis less robust. 
Had studies that considered speculation as a main cause of food price 
hikes incorporated lags in stocks and adjusted this to price changes, the 
positive correlation between stocks and high food prices would have 
been even more extenuated. In an econometric analysis carried out by 
Imai et al in 2008, a rational distributed lag model is used to estimate 
the positive co-relationship between adjustments in global stocks of 
wheat, maize, and rice, as they respond to changing current and lagged 
prices over the period 1986–2008. In their conclusion these researchers 
assert that
Although the results vary a great deal with the specification used, what is 
important to note is that there are many cases in which both current and lagged 
prices have significant effects on the current stocks of these commodities. 
Specifically, contrary to assertions made, the long-run propensity to hold stocks 
(or the long-run effect of commodity prices) is positive. In the case of rice, the 
propensities are substantially larger. This corroborates that speculative hoarding 
has contributed to exacerbating the shortages in the global food market and thus 
reignited inflation.54
52 G20 Agriculture Ministers, ‘Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture’, 
Ministerial Declaration of the of G20 Agriculture Ministers’ meeting on 22 and 23 
June 2011, Paris. Available at http://un-foodsecurity.org/sites/default/files/110623_
G20_AgMinisters_Action_Plan_ Agriculture_Food_Price_Volatility.pdf [Accessed 
21 July 2011].
53 IFPRI Forum 2008, 11.
54 K. Imai, R. Gaiha, and G. Thapa, ‘Food grain Stocks, Prices and Speculation’, 
Brooks World Poverty Institute, The university of Manchester BWPI Working 
Paper 64 (2008). Available at http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/
Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-6408.pdf [Accessed 10 July 2011], 13.
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The fact that rice stocks are more responsive to changes in price 
than in the case of wheat and maize can be explained by what Timmer 
calls a rational behavioural response or the ‘psychological hoarding 
behaviour’ of millions of individuals reacting to the actions of panicky 
governments who, after seeing the spiralling prices of other grains, 
imposed export restrictions on rice or imported huge quantities of the 
grain in order to keep their domestic rice economy stable. Rice is mostly 
grown by small Asian holders, marketed by a dense network of small 
traders and processors, purchased by consumers in a readily storable 
form and stock levels can change quickly at any or all levels of the 
supply chain. Thus, rice speculation in 2007 and 2008 was mostly the 
result of hoarding by millions of individual consumers and suppliers. 
Talk of a price spiral induced a real price spiral.55 
In the case of wheat and corn however, Granger Causality tests 
related to a ‘supply of storage’ model used by Timmer, indicate that 
price expectations are most likely to be influenced by excess liquidity 
or what he calls ‘hot money’:
From this perspective, the most volatile element behind the sudden and sharp run-up 
in food commodity prices was likely to have been the ‘hot money’ in search of the 
next investment boom, after the crash in tech stocks and then real estate derivatives 
(and before the financial system itself crashed). The source of this hot money was 
the massive liquidity infusion provided by the uS Federal Reserve System as it 
sought to stave off (unsuccessfully, as it turns out) a recession caused by collapsing 
real estate values and subsequent threats to the nation’s financial system.56
In other words, massive liquidity creation led to the financial speculation 
that overwhelmed the commodities markets, bringing about huge food 
price increases. Moreover, speculation is so intrinsically entrenched 
institutionally57 that changes in one or more of the commodity prices, such 
as oil, invariably affects another, in this case food. In addition, index funds 
are mandated to keep the value of their commodities in strict proportion. 
55 Timmer, 9
56 Ibid.
57 Wise, ‘Food Price Volatility’.
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This means that when the prices and value of energy products go up, the 
funds have to buy more grain futures in order to maintain the mandated 
proportions. This represents yet another impetus for institutional investors 
to buy agricultural futures regardless of what is happening to the market 
fundamentals of supply and demand for food.58 
All in all, the evidence as elicited from current literature clearly points 
its finger at the intimate connection between global food prices and 
financial speculation as the major cause of the 2008 and 2010/11 food 
crises. Demand and supply considerations such as the oil crises, rising 
input costs, bio-fuel mandates, dire weather conditions, soil depletion, 
inadequate public investment, credit facilities to farmers, trade policy 
restrictions, and so on, have played a significant part in generating 
higher food prices. However, the magnitude and volatility of these price 
hikes cannot be explained by market fundamentals alone. Indeed, food 
production in the years before the crisis had increased much faster than 
utilisation, leading to an increase in stocktaking and a fall in global food 
trade. Furthermore, the aggregate and per capita consumption in both 
India and China had actually fallen.59
Financial deregulation, particularly the uS Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act in 2000, allowed all investors, including investment 
banks, hedge funds, and pension funds to trade in commodity ‘futures’ 
without any position limits, disclosure requirements, or regulatory 
oversight from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
The legislation allowed ‘index traders’ to use swap agreements in order 
to take long-term positions in commodity indexes, making it possible 
for them to trade in commodity futures without the need to exercise any 
physicals ownership of the commodities involved. 
It was the manipulation of the commodity markets and the misleading 
price signals that this generated that led to excessive price volatility in 
2008. Financial intermediaries were able to exploit this instability by 
making huge profits at the expense of both farmers and consumers.60
58 Ghosh, J., ‘The unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance’, Journal of Agrarian 
Change, Vol. 10 No. 1 (January 2010), 72–86.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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The role of speculation in food supply: the case of Malta 
As a small island state, with a population of less than half a million 
and an agricultural sector that contributed less than 2 per cent of its 
Gross Domestic Product in 2010,61 Malta plays a role in the global 
food commodity markets that pales into insignificance when compared 
to that of the rest of the world. Indeed, neither its production nor its 
consumption levels, nor its investments in international financial 
markets can be significant enough to induce an iota of variability in 
international food prices. On the other hand, Malta’s small size, lack 
of natural resources and heavy dependence on imports makes it highly 
vulnerable to international prices, particularly commodity prices. 
Indeed, according to FAOSTAT and the united States Department of 
Agriculture (uSDA) data published by Townsend,62 Malta’s net cereal 
imports as a share of consumption ranks as one of the highest in the 
world, at almost 95 per cent. The level of food consumption as a share 
of total household expenditure ranks as one of the lowest at less than 15 
per cent and is at par with that of some of the most developed countries 
in world. This clearly indicates that while Malta is highly vulnerable 
to global food price shocks in terms of inflation, it is not as vulnerable 
in terms of food security as is the case in most developing countries, 
particularly those in sub-Saharan countries in Africa.
On the other hand, neither can one assume that speculative activities 
in food commodities do not take place on this island. The Maltese have 
always been considered as highly entrepreneurial in spirit, and data 
collated by the Statistical Authority of Malta (NSO), provides some 
surprising and interesting information.63 During the short period of 
61 National Statistics Office, Malta, ‘Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2010,’ News 
Release, 7 September 2011.
62 R. Townsend, S. Zorta, I. Ceccacci, B. Saswati, and C. Delgado, ‘Responding 
to Higher and More Volatile World Food Prices’, World Bank: Agriculture and 
Rural Development Department, 2011. Available at http://iatrc.software.umn.edu/
activities/annualmeetings/themedays/pdfs2011/2011Dec-S14-Delgado_paper.pdf 
[Accessed December 2011].
63 National Statistics Office, Malta (2011). ‘International Trade and Transport 
Statistics,’ unit B2.
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2007–11 when grain prices skyrocketed on the international market, 
high levels of imports were taking place. This positive co-relationship 
between rising grain prices and extraordinary grain imports during this 
period, provides scope for further research in this area. 
Total import and export figures of cereals, namely maize, wheat and 
rice along with sugar show that between the years 2001 and 2006, both 
the volumes traded and their prices were relatively stable. However, the 
last three years of the decade were characterised by both high prices 
and market volatility. This highlights Malta’s vulnerability to the ripple 
effects brought about by the international markets, such as price inflation. 
As Figure 5 indicates, Malta (as on February 2009) had an annual rate of 
food inflation of 10.4 per cent, the second highest in the Eu after the uK.
Source: Eurostat, (as cited by the Rural and Environment Research and Analysis Directorate of 
the Scottish Gov.)64
Figure 5: Malta’s Annual Food Inflation as on February 2009, compared to other 
EU countries
64 Rural and Environmental Research and Analysis Directorate (2009), ‘Food Prices: An 
Overview of Current Evidence’, The Scottish Government. Available at http://www.
scotland.gov.uk/Resource/ Doc/277278/0083249.pdf [Accessed on 12 July 2011].
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The import and export of food commodities by Maltese traders
All import and export figures used in this overview incorporate inter-
Eu and extra-Eu trade and all price values are in nominal terms. It is 
also pertinent to point out that these values do not represent spot market 
values but an average contractual value related to different grades of a 
particular commodity. For example, there are at least seven different 
grades of sugar and about thirty-six different grades of rice. Furthermore, 
the quantities imported or exported are a function of different variables 
including anticipated prices, market conditions, exchange rates, as well 
as storage capacity and these factors have not been separately studied 
in this overview.
In 2007, Malta imported 97.6 million kg of maize, a 113 per cent 
increase over the previous year (Fig. 6). Imports increased by a further 
10.34 per cent in 2008 and this at a time when prices were increasing at 
levels ranging between 13 per cent and 30 per cent annually. 
By 2010, import figures returned to their pre-2007 levels, levels that 
averaged out at about 60 million kg of annual maize imports. 
Exports figures are even more striking. Malta can hardly be considered 
as a food exporting nation. As in the case of maize, no significant maize 
exports were carried out before 2005 and none at all in 2006. However, 
33.2 million kg and 27.3 million kg of maize were exported in 2007 and 
2008 respectively. Average price per kilo increased from €0.16 in 2007 
to €0.25 in 2008, an increase of 56.3 per cent in one year!
A similar pattern may be observed for Durum wheat (Fig. 7). A total 
of 57.5 million kg was imported between 2007 and 2010, a dramatic 
increase when compared to a mere total of 418,775 kg imported between 
2001 and 2006. 
As far as exports are concerned, over 42 million kg of Durum wheat 
were exported between 2007 and 2010, when none had ever been 
exported before 2007. In 2008, the value per kilo of exported Durum 




Figure 6: Maize Imports and Exports (2001–10)
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Source: NSO 




It is also interesting to note that, while the import trend line for 
wheat had a negative coefficient of -0.0141 over a ten-year period; that 
for maize had a positive coefficient of 0.0084 (Fig. 8). In other words, 
maize imports increased even when prices were increasing, indicating 
expectations of further price increases.
Source: NSO 
Figure 8: Wheat and Maize imports (2001-10) in relation to price 
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The high increase of both wheat and maize imports in 2007 and 
2008, as well as the unexpected and substantial export of both grains 
in the same period, throws light on the Maltese entrepreneurial spirit 
in seeking out quick profits. While further research has to be carried 
out on the hypothesis that international food price hikes were enticing 
local importers to speculate and make substantial profits by importing, 
hoarding, and exporting food commodities, the evidence at least seems 
to lead in that direction. A number of import-export companies may 
even have been set up for this purpose. 
Speculative import-export activities are even more evident in the 
case of rice and sugar, given that none of these commodities is cultivated 
in the Maltese islands. With the exceptions of 2004 and 2008, when rice 
imports fell by 29.6 per cent and 36.4 per cent respectively, imports 
between 2001 and 2010 stood at around two million kg annually, with 
the average import price per kilo standing at €0.75 in 2006 (Fig. 9). 
However, in 2007 the average price rose by 25.3 per cent and by another 
20 per cent the following year. While imports were in decline, falling by 
4 per cent in 2007 and 36.4 per cent in 2008, rice exports increased by 




Figure 9: Rice Imports and Exports
An almost identical picture pertains to sugar, with 2007 experiencing 
the highest level of imports at 33.3 million kg (Fig. 10). Again, this 
may have been in anticipation of higher prices. In 2008, sugar exports 
increased by 767.85 per cent at an average value per kg of €0.71. About 
90 per cent of this export was intra-Eu when usually most sugar exports 
are extra-Eu, particularly to North Africa and Arabian Gulf states. 
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Source: NSO 
Figure 10: Sugar Imports and Exports
Both the imports and exports functions for rice extrapolate a positive 
trend line in relation to price over the period 2001–10, with price being 
much more volatile in the export market (Fig. 11). In the latter case, 
the R² value is low at 0.26, indicating that only 26 per cent of the price 
variations can explain the linear regression. This, however, confirms the 
high level of volatility on the international spot price market after 2006. 
Import prices for all the commodities considered here, including sugar, 
may be relatively more stable because the regular business activities of 
domestic entrepreneurs is importation, and hedging may have mitigated 
the excessive volatility that occurred in international spot markets. 
With the exception of rice, and perhaps some sugar products, hardly 
any exports had taken place prior to the 2007/08 price hikes and any 




Figure 11: Import and Export functions of Rice in relation to Price
Commercial speculation of this kind may be having both positive 
and negative effects on the local domestic market. On the one hand, 
high price and commercial speculation may be encouraging investment 
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in Durum wheat production, a development that should be encouraged 
given the dire need to protect the last remaining patches of the Maltese 
rural environment. Domestic Durum wheat production also serves as an 
important substitute for imported animal fodder and both its labour and 
capital intensity are relatively low when compared with other currently 
grown cash crops. 
Commercial speculation in rice, sugar, and maize may, on the other 
hand, lead to inflationary retail prices with ensuing negative effects on 
the local economy. Nevertheless, deeper analytical research is required 
on all of these issues.
Conclusion
Two issues highlighted in the literature on the current situation in food 
commodity markets are the long-term trend for food price increases and 
the excessive volatility of these prices. High and volatile prices generate 
serious food security concerns. Food security problems underlie global, 
political, social, and economic stability.
High prices and excessive volatility are usually associated with 
speculation and price bubbles. Hence, the 2007/08 food crisis triggered 
a controversial debate about the extent of speculative activities as a 
root cause of this crisis. The positive co-relationship between hoarding 
and prices, both current and lagged, has been empirically analysed 
in a number of econometric studies. In the case of wheat and corn, 
volatile elements – mainly excess liquidity or ‘hot money’ in search of 
new investment booms – were an influential factor in driving up price 
expectations and hoarding behaviour. This substantially exacerbated 
the shortages in the global food market and led to further price inflation. 
Commercial speculation, namely the ‘hedging’ of risks by traders, 
is generally seen in a positive light, principally because it ensures the 
availability of much needed liquidity to suppliers, leads to market 
‘price discovery’ and enhances trade. It is financial speculation, 
brought about by the deregulation of financial markets which attracts 
the greatest controversy. Deregulation dismantled the legal barriers 
that once separated investment banking from retail banking and also 
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set aside the supervision of over-the-counter transactions (OTCs) in 
financial derivatives. Globalization and capital mobility associated with 
the speculative trading in ‘derivatives’, particularly food commodity 
index-linked derivatives, overwhelmed commercial speculation and 
exacerbated both the long-term trend in higher food prices and price 
volatility. 
This resulted in dire economic, social, and political consequences for 
vulnerable states, particularly poor net food-importing countries. In this 
light, one may well consider the perpetuation of a food crisis through 
financial speculation as a moral and legal issue, an infringement on 
human rights. Legislative efforts, such as the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act in the uS,65 and the ‘OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties 
and Trade Repositories’ Directive of the Eu,66 are recent attempts to 
reform speculative trading. The latter also known as ‘European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) came into force on 16 August 2012. 
However, these seem to be too tepid and prone to serious loopholes. 
Perhaps legislators fear the economic and financial losses that may 
impinge on the highly lucrative, financial sectors of their economies. 
In spite of its small size, Malta too has been involved in food 
commodity speculation, albeit on a very small scale. However, no matter 
how small, the level of activity involved attests to the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the Maltese. Companies that in the past only imported grain 
for the local market or as a raw material for other processed products 
increased their imports of grains and sugar in 2006/07 in anticipation 
of further price increases. Subsequently, as inferred from NSO data, 
substantial amounts of wheat, maize and rice in particular, were being 
hoarded and eventually exported at lucrative prices. More in depth 
studies of this novel aspect of Maltese commercial food commodities 
speculation have to be carried out in order to substantiate and analyse 
the economic effects of these import-export activities.
65 CFTC 2011.
66 European Parliament (2011), ‘OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and 
Trade Repositories, amend. Directive 98/26/EC’, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/financial-markets/derivatives/ [Accessed: 1 September 2011].
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